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The dissent in the supreme court decision was based on the principle
that a wife, within the confines of the marital home, could not have a
reasonable right to expect that such communication would be free from
interception. This opinion also resorted to the argument that a wife's
right to privacy is subordinate to the husband's right and duty to protect
the marital home.24
The majority opinion in the supreme court decision reflects a
reluctance to incorporate the Appelbaum exception25 into the "Security
of Communications" statute,20 and simply provides a strict construction
of the statute. It is likely that the impact of the case will be restricted
to its facts. However, in light of the rationale of the court, the decision
could very well set precedent for all noncriminal proceedings, in which
intercepted communications obtained in violation of "Security of Com-
munications" statute are sought to be introduced into evidence.
It is the writer's opinion that the court properly rejected the rea-
soning in Appelbaum and recognized a wife's right to privacy in her
communications. It would have been an anachronism for the court to
subordinate a wife's right to privacy at a time in our society when women
are finally being recognized as the equals of men. The right to privacy
is of such importance that it should not be diluted by antiquated and
obsolete social norms. Markham is not to be interpreted to say that all
illegally obtained evidence will be inadmissible in Florida, but the appli-
cation to a civil matter of a statute obviously designed to affect criminal
proceedings, in order to preserve an individual's right to privacy, is
clearly an indication of the court's attitude toward the admissibility of
evidence obtained in derogation of a person's right to privacy.
CAu.Los E. CASUSO
"ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO GIANT STEPS BACKWARD"
-THE COURT LOOKS AT STUDENT RIGHTS
Central Connecticut State College1 allows only those student orga-
nizations officially recognized by the college to use campus facilities for
meetings and other non-college sponsored activities. The petitioners, a
group of students, sought to gain official recognition for an organization
to be known as "A Local Chapter of Students for a Democratic Society."2
Following the established procedures of the college,' the petitioners
24. Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla. 1973).
25. 277 App. Div. 43, 44, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1950).
26. FLA. STAT. ch. 934 (1971).
1. A state supported university located at New Britain, Connecticut [hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the College"].
2. Hereinafter referred to as "S.D.S."
3. The university procedures briefly were as follows: An application was submitted to
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applied for official recognition. When the president of the college denied
them official recognition, the petitioners filed a suit in federal district
court4 for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Two issues were raised in the district court. First, petitioners ques-
tioned the right of the college, a state institution, to deny them recognized
status, with its corresponding privileges and rights, when the college had
accorded that status to other organizations which had complied with the
prescribed procedures. Second, petitioners claimed a denial of procedural
due process since there had been no hearing on their request for recogni-
tion.
The federal district court ordered the respondents to hold a hearing
and clarify the reason for their decision. After that hearing, the college
president again denied the petition for campus recognition. Upon rehear-
ing, the federal district court agreed with his decision.5 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed." On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held, reversed and remanded: Once application for recog-
nition is filed in accordance with the college requirements, the burden is
on the college administration to justify rejection. This burden is not met
if rejection is based merely on an unproven relationship with a national
organization, disagreement with the group's philosophy, or an unsup-
ported fear of disruption. However, rejection may be valid if the college,
among its requirements for recognition, has a rule that prospective groups
affirm in advance their intentions to comply with reasonable campus
regulations and the applicant group fails to so affirm. Healy v. James,
92 S. Ct. 2338 (1972).
Student organizations do not have an absolute right to be recognized
by a college." College administrators have wide discretion in formulating
and implementing reasonable rules and regulations to maintain educa-
tional objectives and determine what actions are most compatible with
those objectives.8 Several courts have held, for example, that a college
the Dean of Students by the organization seeking recognition, then application went before
the Students Affairs Committee, a student-faculty body, and finally with this Committee's
recommendations to the President of the University for final decision. Healy v. James, 445
F.2d 1122, 1124 (2d Cir. 1971).
4. Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1970). The action was brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), alleging a denial of petitioners' associational rights guaranteed by
the first and fourteenth amendments without due process because no hearing was held.
S. Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1970). The district court had retained
jurisdiction and after the hearing held that the students' procedural due process had been
satisfied.
6. Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
8. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). In Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), the federal district court found that an educa-
tional institution can protect itself "against conduct that would damage or destroy it or its
property in toto or in part." Id. at 629. The court upheld the suspension of students, who,
in violation of a university rule participated in mass gatherings because the demonstrations
might have been considered as "unruly or unlawful." Additionally, in Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
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has the right to enact a rule banning all social organizations? However,
in the last decade the courts have overwhelmingly held that constitu-
tional guarantees are protected in our public educational facilities."°
Indeed, in Shelton v. Tucker the Court observed that "[t]he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools."" In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, the United States Supreme Court held that
although first amendment rights must be applied in light of the special
circumstances found in the school environment, it is equally important
that "[n]either students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' ') 2
Therefore, it is not surprising that in the last several years there
have been a number of cases involving constitutional challenges to the
actions of college administrators on first amendment grounds.'3 An argu-
ment common to these cases was well-illustrated by the court in ACLU v.
Radford College.'4 The court noted:
A perusal of these cases makes clear a recurring theme that
once a public school makes an activity available to its students,
faculty, or even the general public, it must operate the activity
in accord with first amendment principles.'
The contention that . . . [the college] . . . has not restricted
the group's activities but has only given privileges to some other
denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969), a case involving campus protest which turned into violent
demonstrations, the court said:
True it is that enrollment in school does not mean the student surrenders any
of his constitutional rights. But by the same token, that fact does not give him
the right to abuse and harass the administrators of the institutions or engage in
conduct detrimental to its well-being or which may tend to deprive other students
of the right to a peaceful atmosphere in which to pursue their ambition for an
education.
Id. at 238.
9. Webb v. State Univ., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954) (limited to organizations with
national ties) ; accord, Waugh v. University of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (state statute);
Wilson v. Board of Educ., 233 Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908). But see Healy v. James, 445
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971), where Judge Smith in his dissent pointed out:
It is perhaps arguable that a college or university might deny the use of its
facilities to any political organization, although the courts have in recent years
greatly expanded the exercise of first amendment rights on other types of public
or even privately owned premises.
Id. at 1134.
10. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); see also Wright, The Con-
stitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
11. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
12. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
13. See, e.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 188
(M.D. Ala. 1969).
14. 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970) [hereinafter referred to as Radlord].
15. Id. at 896. Neither can a state university support a campus newspaper and try to
arbitrarily restrict what it may publish. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass.
1970).
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campus groups misses the point because restriction and privilege
are different sides of the same coin. One group is restricted from
doing what another is privileged to do."
In Healy, the Court rejected the argument that nonrecognition of
the student group would still allow students to meet and function off
campus.
Aside from the obvious psychological boost which official recogni-
tion gives to a group, its true importance is in affording an organization
the use of all forms of campus publicity, sponsorship of activities, and
college facilities which are necessary for an organization to operate
effectively.1
In a recent case 18 involving almost the same factual situation as
Healy, the Court drew the following analogy concerning a university
denying recognition to a student group:
What is at issue here is whether the students affiliated with the
Chapter will be permitted to use the buildings and grounds of
the campus to conduct meetings and discussions. The restriction
imposed by the University is analogous to one attempting to
prevent a particular group or individual from speaking on
school premises. 19
In Healy, the Court recognized that a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on campus; nevertheless, the denial of
recognition of the group was a form of prior restraint, denying the peti-
tioners' organization the range of associational activities previously
discussed."' Therefore, "once petitioners had an application in con-
formity with the requirements, the burden was upon the college admin-
istration to justify its decision of rejection. ' 21 While safeguarding the
interest of the state in preventing disruption on the campus may justify
such action (restraint), a "heavy burden rests on the college to demon-
strate the appropriateness of that action.) 22
The decision in Healy affirmed the prior reasoning in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, which held that
primary first amendment rights could only be forbidden by the school
administrators upon a showing that engaging in the conduct "would
materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropri-
16. ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 898 (W.D. Va. 1970).
17. Healy v. James, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 2343 (1972).
18. University of S. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of S.
Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 566, 567. See also Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.
1969); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. I1. 1968); Dickson v. Sitter-
son, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
20. 92 S. Ct. at 2348.
21. Id. at 2347.
22. Id. at 2348.
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ate discipline in the operation of the school .... ,,2" In determining what
conduct would be material and substantial the Tinker Court noted that
any deviation from the majority view may inspire fear, however, neither
an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, nor an action
based upon the desire of school officials to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular view are sufficient.24
Remanding Healy, the Court sought to provide guidance to lower
courts and discussed the four possible justifications (all closely related)
for nonrecognition proffered by the college president. Under other cir-
cumstances, these justifications may have been adequate grounds for the
denial of recognition, but at least three of them, and possibly all four,
are inadequate based on the facts of the case.
The first ground is the possible relationship, if any, between peti-
tioners and the National S.D.S. organization. Courts grant college admin-
istrators wide discretion in governing their campuses.26 They have upheld
a college's right to ban all organizations with national ties,26 but have
stressed that once an activity is opened to some, it must be operated
according to first amendment principles.27 Additionally, the courts have
consistently held that guilt by association alone is not enough. "The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with
an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent
to further those illegal aims.' 28 While the petitioners indicated they
shared some of the beliefs of the national organization, they did assert,
both orally and in writing, complete independence from the national
organization .2 Thus, affiliation would be an inadequate ground in this
case upon which to base a denial of recognition.
Second, the college president relied on an abhorrence of the group's
philosophy, which he characterized as consistent with that of the national
organization, i.e., violence and disruption. However, the Court held that
mere disagreement with a group's philosophy, as repugnant as those views
may be, affords no justification for the denial of first amendment rights.
Therefore, it becomes immaterial whether the petitioners did in fact
advocate a philosophy of "destruction. ' 8
0
If the college president's reasoning had been based upon the orga-
nization's activities rather than philosophy, and these activities could be
factually supported, then the Court's prior holdings involving permissible
speech as opposed to impermissible conduct would give a basis of non-
recognition. The Court in discussing the third basis of the college presi-
23. 393 U.S. 503, S09 (1969) (emphasis added). See also, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 508, 509.
29. See note 9 supra.
26. Webb v. State Univ., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
27. See note 15 supra.
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2348 (1972).
29. Id. at 2349.
30. Id. at 2349.
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dent's decision points out that "[t] he critical line, heretofore drawn for
determining the permissibility of regulation, is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy 'directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action ... likely to incite or produce such action.' "I' The Court
held that if there was evidence to support the conclusion that petitioners
posed a threat of material disruption or lawless action, then the president's
decision should be affirmed. However, from the hearing officer's remarks
and the record, there was no substantial evidence that these individuals
acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus.8 2
Finally, a college administration has the right to impose reasonable
guidelines with respect to the time, place, and manner in which student
groups may conduct their activities.8 3 They also have the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations requiring a group seeking official
recognition to affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable
campus rules. 4 Such a requirement, in the Court's opinion, would not
impose an impermissible condition on the students' associational rights.
Since this constitutes merely an agreement to conform with reasonable
standards respecting conduct, the students' Constitutional freedoms of
speech, assembly, and petition are not violated. 5
The record before the Court was not conclusive as to whether proper
guidelines existed at the time petitioners' application was initiated, and
the Court accordingly remanded for a determination of this point.8"
The Healy Court did not specify how restrictive promulgated standards
might be and yet still remain Constitutionally permissible. In addition,
if such standards do exist, there is no indication as to what type of prior
assurances would be required of the group. Would a mere statement
purporting compliance be sufficient, or can the college within its discre-
tion require affirmative acts as well from certain groups? The Court's
decision tends to grant wide discretion to the college administrator and,
thus, the possibility that various groups may still face substantial obstacles
in gaining recognition may prove to be a reality.
JACK E. LONDON
31. Id. at 2350, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1960). See also Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 230-32 (1961).
32. Id. at 2350.
33. Id. at 2352. See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. l~v.
1027 (1969).
34. 92 S. Ct. at 2352; see, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); University of S. Miss. Chapter of Miss. Civil Liberties
Union v. University of S. Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971); ACLU v. Radford College,
315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
35. 92 S. Ct. at 2352.
36. Id. at 2352, 2353. See also Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971), the
appendix following the decision includes a copy of the Central Connecticut State College
Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, which outlines the policies
concerning campus life, including formation of campus groups. Only a very broad inter-
pretation of Article V(A) could possibly fulfill the requirement the Court alludes to. Id. at
1134-39.
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